

# After Decades of Financial Challenge, How Can Oakland Reorient Itself?

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New legislation in California will allow school districts, such as Oakland Unified School District (OUSD), to consider the “financial and academic impact” when approving or denying applications for new charter schools.<sup>1</sup> This caps a year dominated by debate where some OUSD leaders [alleged](#) rising charter enrollment caused layoffs and reductions in essential services for district students. This new law may limit the growth of charter schools in Oakland, but the effect on the district’s bottom line may be less than district leaders hope.

[OUSD has been in fiscal distress](#) in the past and [faces fiscal challenges](#) that continue to play out in classrooms across the city. Teachers and families are right to want solutions, but independent reviews show that charter schools are not the primary cause of Oakland’s troubles. Indeed, as we describe in this brief, enrollment in the district’s schools has stabilized and revenues are at historic highs. We explore evidence related to the causes of OUSD’s financial crisis and why previous efforts to right the ship have failed. With a renewed focus, can Oakland reorient itself as a system of schools—with charter schools and the larger community as partners—that will attract families back to the city and help stabilize OUSD finances? This brief points to a possible path forward.

## How Charter Schools Affect District Finances: A Primer

In California, school districts are funded based in large part on the average number of students attending each year. As a result, when fewer students show up—whether because they are enrolling in public charter schools or private schools, transferring to nearby districts, or moving out of state—school districts receive less money. In theory, districts can adjust their expenditures based on the number of students they currently serve. As fewer students enroll, for example, the district may require fewer teachers, counselors, and central office administrators.

However, while school districts must no longer pay to educate students who transfer to publicly funded charter schools, they must pay costs that can’t be adjusted immediately as school enrollment changes. A school might lose 10 students, for example, but still need the same number of teachers or school administrators. A loss of 1,000 students may not change a district’s pension obligations or debt payments. Additionally, the students who remain in district schools could have relatively higher needs than the students who depart—whether for charter schools or neighboring districts—which could also increase costs.

How these impacts come to affect district bottom lines, though, isn’t clear. [One study suggests](#) increases in charter school enrollment produces modest, short-term impacts on California school districts’ fund balances, with district revenues falling faster than expenditures in the year following an enrollment shift. [A study by CRPE](#) shows that school districts where charter schools enroll larger shares of students are no more likely to enter fiscal distress, a determination made by County Offices of Education in California.

Moreover, any fiscal impacts should be considered alongside possible educational benefits to students. Charter schools give new choices to Oakland families and rigorous studies show students attending charter schools in the San Francisco Bay Area are learning more in math and reading than their peers in traditional public schools.<sup>2</sup>


## OUSD’s Financial Troubles Are Rooted in Practices Established Before Charter Schools Entered the Landscape

OUSD’s financial crisis surged into the public consciousness in 2003 when district officials requested the largest public school bailout in California’s history. Media reports suggest [overspending](#) had gone unnoticed, either because of old and ineffective accounting systems or a superintendent who did not pay attention to the financial challenges raised by his staff. An emergency \$100 million loan kept the district out of bankruptcy and a state-appointed administrator assumed control. Charter schools had only recently entered the public lexicon and only about 2,600 Oakland students (out of more than 52,000 students in the district) attended a charter school. OUSD returned to local control six years later, but its financial challenges remained. It retained \$89 million in debt and an \$18 million budget gap (figure 1). As [one school board member said](#) on the eve of the return to local control, “We’re creeping back to a very dangerous financial situation. We are going to be right up against the edge of a cliff.”

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*—School board member*

A decade later, financial mismanagement and unsustainable spending persisted. In May 2018 [California’s Fiscal Crisis and Management Assistance Team \(FCMAT\)](#) reported that OUSD’s “highly unusual” accounting hid budget problems and hindered “an honest and open assessment of the district’s current financial condition.” The news came as OUSD faced escalating projected shortfalls—rising to \$60 million by 2020—despite years of cuts.

**FIGURE 1. OUSD Has Had More Than a Decade of Deficits**



Source: CRPE analysis of OUSD financial data, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data, National Public Education Financial Survey (F-33).

For more than a decade, the Alameda County Office of Education has not been able to certify that OUSD can meet its financial obligations, and the growing stack of financial audits hasn’t changed that fact. As of March 2019 FCMAT found the district met only one of twenty-three of its own recommendations in its Fiscal Vitality Plan.<sup>3</sup>

## Financial Challenges Have Persisted Despite Growing Revenues

OUSD has seen growing revenues, which—all things being equal—should translate to greater resources on a total and per-student basis to serve all students well. The district serves 15,000 fewer students today than it did when it entered fiscal distress in 2002, yet its budget is more than 20 percent larger. On a per-student basis, the district has benefited from California’s commitment to improve equity across districts and drive more resources to high-need students. According to the Alameda County grand jury, OUSD’s revenues were \$16,154 per student based on the district’s average daily attendance of 34,841 students in 2017–2018 (figure 2). This was second-highest among Alameda County’s school districts and reflects the higher number of disadvantaged students in OUSD.<sup>4</sup>

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FIGURE 2. Per-Pupil Revenues Are Up 40 Percent in OUSD Since 2009–2010



Source: “Fiscal, Demographic, and Performance Data on California’s K-12 Schools,” Ed-Data website, accessed May 1, 2019.

But these dollars aren’t necessarily making their way into classrooms. OUSD spends more money proportionately on central office and other noninstructional costs. As a percent of the district’s budget, expenditures on administration, maintenance, and operations rose from 14 percent of the budget in 2007 to 17 percent in 2017.<sup>5</sup> For fiscal year 2017–2018, the grand jury report concluded that OUSD spends more than *six times* the statewide average on supervisor and administrator salaries, more than three times the statewide average for professional/consulting services and operating expenditures, and nearly twice as much on non-teaching classified staff compared to other districts around the state.<sup>6</sup> A separate analysis concluded OUSD spent \$1,400 more per student on operational expenses in 2014–2015 than the average charter school in Oakland.<sup>7</sup>

Nor have teachers reaped the rewards of rising revenues. Oakland ranked last out of 37 districts examined on the share of spending for certificated teacher salaries.<sup>8</sup> Low teacher salaries have contributed to labor unrest—including the *teacher’s strike* in early 2019—and undermined teachers’ faith in OUSD to strike a fair bargain.

A previous grand jury report determined that OUSD failed to make corresponding cuts as its enrollment declined over 15 years, and operated too many schools: 84 campuses with an average enrollment of 412 students. Nearby Fremont Unified School District enrolls a similar number of students as OUSD but operates only 42 campuses.<sup>9</sup> The number of small schools is not an accident; since 2000 OUSD has created smaller learning environments as part of an effort to improve instruction and empower a new generation of school leaders. However, creating smaller schools creates a financial strain on the district, leaving schools undersupported if they have the same administrative staffing formulas as larger schools or resulting in underutilized buildings.

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## OUSD Does Not Fully Control Rising Costs

Despite new investments by the state of California through the Local Control Funding Formula, many costs that are not under OUSD's control, such as pensions, are rising.<sup>10</sup> In 2013–2014, the state required school districts to contribute 8.25 percent of teacher salaries to CalSTRS, the plan for teachers. By 2020–2021, the annual contribution rate will more than double due to accumulated debt and a change in actuarial assumptions.

State dollars for special education have remained flat, forcing districts to use an increasing share of their general-purpose dollars for special education as costs rise. Per-student costs have increased in the state due to rising district employee expenses and a proportionate increase of students with disabilities who require more intensive services.


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An analysis of OUSD in 2014 found the district had 12 percent of students receiving special education services compared to 7 percent in Oakland charter schools. The analysis also suggested the district tended to enroll students with disabilities that typically require more intensive services than the charter sector and was also more likely to use more restrictive—and more costly—placements compared to other urban school districts.<sup>11</sup>

## Enrollment Declines Occurred Before Charter School Enrollment Grew

Despite charter school growth, OUSD's enrollment has been stable at approximately 37,000 students since 2011 (figure 3). During this same period, charter schools added 6,000 seats with little effect on the district's total enrollment or total revenues. In 2017–2018, total district and charter school enrollment in Oakland was 50,231. Charter schools authorized by OUSD enrolled 13,135 (26 percent). Charter schools authorized by Alameda County Office of Education served approximately 2,700 students. Further, 15 percent of the students enrolled in Oakland charter schools did not come from OUSD, but rather from surrounding communities.<sup>12</sup>

**FIGURE 3. OUSD Enrollment Has Stabilized Despite Charter School Enrollment Growth**



Source: National Center for Education Statistics and OUSD Enrollment Dashboard.

One important caveat when considering enrollment is that district students may have more expensive needs than charter school students—and that even as the growth of charter enrollments hasn’t affected total district enrollment, it may affect the distribution of need between the two sectors. In addition to the differences in special education needs noted above, an analysis by Education Resource Strategies found that a cohort of students entering 6th and 9th grades at district-run schools had a negative achievement gap compared to those entering charter schools. District-run schools were more likely to receive students who enroll midyear, and serve more students in foster care or experiencing homelessness. However, the sectors enroll similar numbers of English language learners and socioeconomically disadvantaged students.<sup>13</sup>

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While enrollment in OUSD has remained mostly stable, it is likely to face declines in the future—whether or not the charter sector continues to grow. The California Department of Finance predicts a statewide enrollment decline of 250,000 between the 2017–2018 and 2027–2028 school years. The student population across all of Alameda County is expected to grow modestly by 3,000.<sup>14</sup>

Oakland is not alone in facing economic and demographic pressures. Across California, [school districts are losing enrollment](#), however, in many cases, charter schools are not the cause. For example, Long Beach Unified School District (in Los Angeles County) enrollment has fallen by 6,500 students in the past five years, but the city has only two charter schools, which together enroll just 250 students. Long Beach has been able to adjust without entering into fiscal distress.

As a result, changes in the growth of charter schools is unlikely to fundamentally alter the factors that have driven OUSD to the financial brink. Revenues have increased but have not kept up with increases in spending. OUSD must find a way to reduce costs or find new revenues if it is to finally emerge from persistent financial challenges.

## Prior Efforts to Fix Oakland Have Fizzled, But There Is Hope

The crisis narrative isn't new, but attempts to solve OUSD's financial and academic challenges have been piecemeal. State receivership in the early 2000s addressed short-term issues only. Oakland has had significant turnover in the superintendent's office; more recently, it has [lost chief financial officers](#). The grand jury report concluded:

**Within management ranks, self-interested decisions by midlevel staff and repeated breakdowns in the chain of command without anyone being held accountable has helped perpetuate all of this dysfunction. . . District leadership has not committed to a long-range, comprehensive strategic plan, implemented using sound financial practices. All too often, policies and procedures have fallen by the wayside and administrative staff who are frequently undertrained in best practices make decisions that are not in the best interests of the school district.<sup>15</sup>**

As an added challenge, to settle the 2019 teacher strike, the board agreed to raises that will increase costs by \$65 million over four years. To maintain state-mandated reserves, the board had to identify \$21.7 million in cuts. If the board agrees to provide other staff with contracts similar to that of the teachers, it could further increase costs by \$46 million over the same four-year period.<sup>16</sup> As of June 2019 the board was proceeding with a proposal to [close school campuses](#) without buy-in from the community and amid fears that closures will disproportionately impact disadvantaged families and encourage families to enroll in charter schools or move to neighboring, less troubled school districts.

The financial crisis is taking place against a backdrop in which too many students lack access to quality education. Arguments about the need to cut costs are unlikely to move families who don't want to see schools closed and who care about maintaining competitive wages for teachers and staff. If the district makes fiscal decisions without connecting them to decisions about how to improve learning, school closures and other service reductions will feel like disinvestment to families and community members. Oakland has underserved and economically distressed neighborhoods (often described locally as the "flats," compared to the more affluent "hills") against the backdrop of rising housing and living costs in the fast-changing Bay Area economy that affects families and teachers alike. While local charter schools provide many students with good options, they have not reached all neighborhoods. Teachers and family members at district-run schools may perceive that the charter sector doesn't care about district challenges, even as district schools struggle to improve.

Despite these challenges, OUSD Superintendent Kyla Johnson-Trammell seems to understand what is at stake. [In a commentary](#), she wrote that it is the district's responsibility to reduce costs, while noting it is the state's responsibility to fully fund education. Newer community groups, such as [Go Public Schools](#) and [Educate78](#), are working to build urgency and support for reform. The school board passed a "Community of Schools" resolution, which includes plans to offer long-term leases of campuses to charter schools along with other collaborations. This suggests that rather than blaming charter schools for OUSD's financial challenges, the district might partner with the sector to achieve common ends. In 2018 the state of California (through Assembly Bill 1840) worked to get ahead of the crisis by [making available an estimated \\$20 million](#) to help reduce OUSD's operating deficit in exchange for making cuts and increasing the district's financial reserves.

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## The Oakland School System Is Well-Positioned to Reorient, But It Will Take a Strong Plan and Coordinated Help

In a community fatigued by a decades-long fiscal crisis, OUSD must focus its efforts by investing in learning. With a home-grown superintendent, slowed charter school growth, and technical support and guidelines from state advisors, the conditions are favorable. The [Community of Schools Citywide Plan](#) provides a tentative step

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forward for increased cooperation across district and charter lines. The state has shown an interest and responsibility in ensuring that the district can recover and thrive. The long-term goal: righting the ship and welcoming students back aboard because they want to come. The experience of other cities shows this is possible. OUSD is unique in some ways, but not in others; there are [paths forward for cities](#) facing declining enrollment and fiscal distress. School

districts can thrive academically and fiscally even as students who need alternatives via charter schools choose that option. As this analysis shows, however, the long-term solution will require a wide lens and more than just some tough fiscal choices. Additional state funding and changes to the state funding formula may be required to help combat rising costs faced by all California schools. And the OUSD school board, backed by the community, must take steps that will result in a comprehensive financial *and academic* improvement plan.

Our recommendations include steps OUSD should take immediately to develop a coherent strategy along these lines and build community support, charter partnerships, and state advocacy to make all the pieces come together. Community groups, charter leaders, and state policymakers should also take other actions. It is in everyone's interest for OUSD to thrive and it will take everyone's help.

**To rebuild community confidence, the board must embrace financial reform.** Transparency and accountability to the public are necessary preconditions to rebuild trust and gain community support for other tough decisions that may be needed in the future. When the teachers and families read reports that millions of dollars have been wasted, it seems unfair to close campuses or offer teacher salaries that are lower than other districts. OUSD must be able to make a credible case that it is acting as a responsible steward of public dollars and that money is being spent on students and teachers as much as possible.

Reviews by FCMAT, the county, and others have suggested no shortage of improvements to the basic internal controls and ways to reduce unsustainable spending. Additionally, developing and updating plans for fiscal solvency, with budgetary approvals from the Alameda County Office of Education, are necessary for OUSD to receive state dollars to reduce its deficit under Assembly Bill 1840.<sup>17</sup> The school board must truly empower, and in turn expect, Superintendent Johnson-Trammell to implement these recommendations. She needs a CFO and financial team with the authority, expertise, and desire to see reforms through, which may take several years. The board should strengthen her ability to build an effective team in the cabinet and central office, and the board should hold them accountable if they don't deliver a more effective and sustainable school system.

**To ensure central office spending is focused on high-value services, OUSD should engage school communities.** School leaders, teachers, and families are best positioned to minimize the impact of future budget cuts on students and make new investments in critical supports for students and teachers. Putting school communities in the driver's seat also eases the "impossible job" facing district leaders. OUSD should allow schools to voluntarily buy services from the central office, which will encourage a service orientation and make clear which units provide value. It would ensure that OUSD's central office expenditures—which are substantially higher than neighboring districts—create benefits for school communities based on the day-to-day realities of students and teachers. OUSD should look toward districts like Springfield Public Schools in Massachusetts, which has created extensive central office service purchasing lists for their schools. Likewise, in Chicago, school leaders have [determined budgets and key staffing decisions](#) since 1989, which is among the factors that contribute to [increased student learning](#) there.

As a first step, the OUSD school board should call for complete transparency in where dollars are currently going and then work to give high-performing schools the option to opt out of central services, including staff development, special education, and even curriculum and instruction supports. Lower-performing schools should also be given the opportunity to weigh in on how they would like to use their funding differently, but as part of a well-developed school improvement plan.

**To minimize disruption and achieve savings, school closures or consolidations must be carefully planned.** OUSD has indicated it plans to *close or consolidate* more schools. As disruptive as this may be, one of the largest unresolved expenses affecting OUSD’s fiscal sustainability is that too many buildings are operating at less than full capacity. The ongoing maintenance and operations costs are simply unsustainable, and given the long-term demographic projections for the area, this is unlikely to change even if charter school enrollment does not grow. Past administrations failed to responsibly consolidate schools as families made other choices, leaving the current OUSD board with difficult choices.

The board must carefully plan school closures it determines are necessary, developing protocols with the community for when or how students will transition, if they will have priority or their choice of other campuses, or if existing students will be allowed to complete their studies before a campus closes. OUSD should demonstrate that school closures or consolidations will not just target low-performing schools, higher-need areas, or the least politically-connected neighborhoods, but rather will impact the city as fairly as possible. Several considerations and factors could be used, including facility condition and location, which the [California Department of Education](#) outlines. In the early 2000s, Kansas City, Missouri, had to close 29 schools. The district and civic leaders invested heavily in public engagement, which was found to help the public accept the decision. Kansas City developed an index that made a rational case for which campuses should be closed and made changes based on public feedback. The intentional consolidation of campuses can be further set up for success if leaders recognize the need to manage the process as a [merger of two learning communities with distinct cultures](#), not just campuses.

While acknowledging the courage the current OUSD leadership has shown on this issue, we would urge them to also think about out-of-the-box solutions on how the overall facility space could be reduced *while maintaining some campuses*, which we explain recommendations below.

**To preserve small, valued campuses, OUSD should rethink school staffing models.**

The district operates a large number of relatively small schools. As Nate Levenson details, creative staffing arrangements that enable schools to share administrators, teachers, and support services can provide many of the financial benefits of a larger school environment while enabling the district to maintain distinctive learning environments for students.<sup>18</sup> Rural schools—unable to offer a full complement of electives and administrative supports on their own—seek collaboratives with schools and districts that build economies of scale. Alternatively, if OUSD must reduce the number of campuses, it might approach a group of schools and explore consolidation options that enable deeper investments in students and teachers. The teachers union must be an engaged partner in rethinking school staffing models as they will most likely require changes to the collective bargaining agreement. Parents look to teachers for guidance on important schooling decisions. Being clear about how such actions can benefit students and teachers—such as providing an expanded array of course offerings or increased leadership opportunities for teachers—and partnering with communities to ensure their voices are included, may help avoid some of the inevitable conflict that comes with school closures and consolidations.

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**To encourage educators to innovate and develop quality schools, OUSD should explore new partnerships.** Previous efforts to invest in autonomous school leaders—such as the small schools initiative—have shown promise and external partners could potentially help fund and support the work.

Cities such as Indianapolis, Atlanta, and Los Angeles have turned to partnerships in supporting school leaders to give more flexibility to district principals and teachers so they can innovate and as a way to improve struggling schools. The [Partnership for Los Angeles Schools](#) is a locally founded school management organization that operates autonomous district schools under contract with the Los Angeles Unified School District. Teachers remain district employees under the existing collective bargaining agreement, but partnership employees

support and develop the capacity of school leaders, teachers, and parents. As an added benefit, because funding for these students would still flow through OUSD, these models do not create the same sort of revenue “loss” on the district’s financial statements. OUSD could develop some terms of operation that benefit the district financially or academically but also benefit the school. For example, the schools might receive a smaller share of the state per-pupil revenues to allow OUSD to pay down legacy costs, but would get long-term access to district facilities. Communities have found that partnership schools avoid some of the political battles that accompany charter schools.

Partnerships could increase OUSD capacity for school improvement and increase the quality of schools for students and families. The district could pilot this solution at one or two schools and then expand the network if it proves successful and more educators want the opportunity. Existing state law would allow OUSD to do what LA’s Partnership allows, but other states, such as Texas and Indiana, have adopted new partnership frameworks into state law. If California legislators defined the autonomies these “partnership” schools enjoy in state law, it could attract new operators, even if the schools are less independent than charter schools.

**To ensure all students have modern and suitable learning environments, OUSD, the charter sector, and the city should collaborate on a master education facilities plan.** Even though the district has too much facility space, charter schools struggle to find suitable facilities and to access surplus district space. OUSD is inconsistent in how it shares spaces with charter schools, sometimes offering schools insufficient space to house all the school’s students or only offering short-term leases. This situation is unsustainable and students across the city are ultimately paying the price.

The OUSD board has indicated it will offer long-term leases to charter schools, and this is a good first step. But the city urgently needs a coherent education facilities master plan that, over the course of five to seven years, will allocate facility space owned by the district (and possibly by the city) on the basis of the highest and best use to accelerate student success. The plan must be agnostic about whether schools are district- or charter-run. The priority should be school performance and community need for various offerings, such as career and technical programs or schools that have demonstrated a track record of sending students in poverty to college. School consolidations—and possibly closures—must be part of that plan. But if local communities are engaged from the start in conversations about what schools they want in their neighborhoods, the focus will be on creating new opportunity.

In the course of this long-term plan, the charter school community might also agree to targeted growth in the neighborhoods most in need of new programs. When space isn’t needed for district or charter students, OUSD should consider how parts of some campuses could be repurposed for community needs. For example, could the city assume some property as places for parks or community services and offset costs or pay the district for their use? Could portions of campuses be redeveloped as affordable housing for teachers or mixed-use commercial spaces? New revenues from these purposes could help finance renovations in remaining classroom spaces. Because it involves both district and charter school officials, and requires extensive public engagement, this type of planning may work best when facilitated by a neutral third party. The city of Oakland, through the mayor’s office, could be suited to lead this work. An innovative, citywide focus may encourage voters to approve new bond or parcel tax measures to support renovation and construction needs.

**To address cost concerns and improve equity for all students, OUSD and the charter sector must collaborate more closely on students with special learning needs.** Closer coordination between charter schools and OUSD on special education, services for English language learners, and newly arrived immigrants would demonstrate to the public that responsibility for all of Oakland’s children is shared equitably. It could also alleviate concerns that the district is bearing an unfair share of the costs associated with educating these students. It could help achieve economies of scale or cost reductions that benefit schools in both sectors. While the OUSD school board has called for collaboration through its Community of Schools resolution, it must work closely with the charter schools to implement a structure for collaboration. Teacher-to-teacher and principal-to-principal networks could improve instruction for students, including those with more profound needs, and create innovation in district and charter schools alike.

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If Oakland’s charter schools were willing to join the same Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) as OUSD, this could create efficiencies, ensure more equitable access to charter school options for students with IEPs, and position the system to receive more state dollars for special education.<sup>19</sup> However, OUSD must help charter schools recognize the mutual gains from doing so. For example, parents of students with disabilities may not be aware that Oakland charter schools are an option for them. The district should find ways to include local charter schools in IEP transition discussions and Child Find placement services, and include charter school information on the OUSD special education website. The district must be mindful that a lack of good management and provision of services drove charter schools to leave the SELPA in the first place.

Other cities have addressed the lack of specialized service capacity in charter schools by working with local funders to provide grants for charter schools to develop specialized programs or expertise and including charter schools in district professional development opportunities. Denver Public Schools even partnered to co-create innovative new programs to serve students with low-incidence disabilities in charter schools using district facilities.

As a longer-term goal, California’s special education funding formula should more adequately serve students with disabilities. Policymakers should create [better parity](#) between SELPAs and provide a [reimbursement mechanism](#) for extraordinary or very high-cost services. Oakland charter leaders could work with the district to advocate for these needed changes, helping to demonstrate that leaders care about all students no matter which school they attend.

## Conclusion

The Oakland Unified School District faces real challenges that have persisted for several decades. The district must make fundamental changes in the ways it spends money and oversees schools. However, the city can get past the perpetual crisis narrative if the OUSD board, the community, and local charter schools can come together to recognize that talking past each other is neither productive nor warranted. Enrollment across the city—in district and charter schools—appears to be stable or even growing slightly. While charter schools are only a small part of the district’s financial problems, they can become a big part of the solution. The superintendent and board appear willing to work with them. If Oakland can rebuild trust, engage the community, rightsize its facilities, incentivize the creation of quality schools, and work across district and charter lines, students and families will benefit.

## Endnotes

1. A.B. 1505, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
2. *Urban Charter School Study Report on 41 Regions* (Stanford, CA: Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2015); *Urban Charter School Study Workbook* (Stanford, CA: Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2015); *Charter School Performance in California* (Stanford, CA: Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2014).
3. Exhibit P in [letter from Tamara Ethier](#), Fiscal Crisis & Management Assistance Team, to California state legislative leaders, March 1, 2019.
4. *The Oakland Unified School District's Broken Administrative Culture* (Oakland, CA: Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, Civil Grand Jury, 2019).
5. CRPE analysis of OUSD financial statements.
6. See *The Oakland Unified School District's Broken Administrative Culture*.
7. This number may not account for some differing levels of student need. See *Informing Equity: Student need, spending, and resource use in Oakland's public schools* (San Francisco, CA: Education Resource Strategies, 2017).
8. See *The Oakland Unified School District's Broken Administrative Culture*.
9. *Oakland Unified School District: Hard Choices Needed to Prevent Insolvency* (Oakland, CA: Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, Civil Grand Jury, 2018).
10. *Oakland Unified School District Fiscal Health Risk Analysis* (Bakersfield, CA: Fiscal Crisis & Management Assistance Team, 2017).
11. *Informing Equity*, Education Resource Strategies, 2017.
12. "Charter School Enrollment (2017–2018)," Office of Charter Schools, Oakland Unified School District website, accessed May 9, 2019.
13. *Informing Equity*, Education Resource Strategies, 2017.
14. California Department of Finance K–12 Projections 2018 Series Report W(1), Projected California Public K–12 Graded Enrollment by County by School Year.
15. See *The Oakland Unified School District's Broken Administrative Culture*.
16. Ibid.
17. Exhibit P in [letter from Tamara Ethier](#), Fiscal Crisis & Management Assistance Team, to California state legislative leaders, March 1, 2019.
18. Nate Levenson, *Smarter Budgets, Smarter Schools: How to Survive and Thrive in Tight Times*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2012).
19. One analysis found the sectors together miss out on over \$9 million a year by not being the same SELPA. See *Informing Equity*, Education Resource Strategies, 2017.

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## About the Center on Reinventing Public Education

CRPE is a nonpartisan research and policy analysis center at the University of Washington Bothell. We develop, test, and support bold, evidence-based, systemwide solutions to address the most urgent problems in K-12 public education across the country. Our mission is to reinvent the education delivery model, in partnership with education leaders, to prepare all American students to solve tomorrow’s challenges. Since 1993 CRPE’s research, analysis, and insights have informed public debates and innovative policies that enable schools to thrive. Our work is supported by multiple foundations, contracts, and the U.S. Department of Education.

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